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One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? 
Substantive Equality, Systemic Discrimination and Pay Equity at the Supreme 
Court of Canada 
 
by Fay Faraday* 
 
ABSTRACT 
In 2018, thirty one years after the equality rights guarantee in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms took effect, women won their first Supreme Court of Canada 
appeal based on sex discrimination under section 15 of the Charter. Quebec (Attorney 
General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé des services 
sociaux struck down provisions of Quebec’s Pay Equity Act that denied women 
remedies for sex discrimination in pay that was identified through pay equity audits. 
Since 1987, the SCC has recognized that systemic discrimination infuses the systems, 
institutions and relationships of power through which our society is organized. Yet, only 
rarely do truly systemic cases of discrimination come before the Court and when they 
do the Court has struggled to apply an appropriately systemic analysis. Alliance marks a 
meaningful breakthrough. This paper examines how Alliance and its companion case, 
Centrale des syndicats du Québec v Quebec (Attorney General), represent a strong 
step forward in protecting against systemic discrimination. It analyzes jurisprudential 
advances on substantive equality, the role of section 15(2) of the Charter, and bringing 
a gender lens to the section 1 analysis. Examining the dissenting reasons, the paper 
also analyzes how the two cases simultaneously highlight the unresolved fractures at 
the foundation of equality rights jurisprudence that threaten its stability going forward. 
Finally it reviews a federal legislative initiative and a provincial litigation strategy – both 
on pay equity – that followed in the immediate aftermath of Alliance and CSQ to 
highlight the fragility of section 15’s protection in the face of political resistance to 
substantive equality. It asks whether, in a period of intensifying political polarization, 
governments have stopped engaging in the “Charter dialogue” when it comes to 
equality rights. 
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 Fay Faraday is an Assistant Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. As a constitutional and human rights litigator, 
she has represented clients in numerous Charter cases before the Supreme Court of Canada. Along with co-counsel 
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I - INTRODUCTION 
   In 2018, thirty one years after the equality rights guarantee in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms took effect, women won their first Supreme Court of 
Canada appeal based on sex discrimination under section 15 of the Charter. This 
historical “first” was delivered in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel 
professionnel et technique de la santé des services sociaux.1 The Court vindicated 
women’s longstanding entitlement to non-discriminatory pay at work by striking down 
provisions of Quebec’s Pay Equity Act (PEA) which allowed identified sex discrimination 
in pay to go unrectified. The SCC had ruled previously on five section 15 appeals 
alleging sex discrimination against women. All five claims failed. In only one did the 
Court even find a section 15 violation before dismissing it as justifiable under section 1 
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of the Charter.2 Until 2018, the only successful section 15 sex discrimination cases at 
the SCC had been brought by men.3 Alliance thus marks a watershed. An unsuccessful 
companion pay equity appeal, Centrale des syndicats du Québec v Quebec (Attorney 
General),4 was released the same day. Together the rulings plant seeds from which a 
more rigorous substantive equality analysis could grow to confront systemic 
discrimination. But celebration should remain tempered because the two cases 
simultaneously blaze as warning signs of the unrelentingly unresolved fractures that lie 
at the foundation of section 15 jurisprudence.  
Three decades after its first Charter equality ruling, Andrews v. Law Society of 
British Columbia,5 the SCC continues to wrestle with the most basic equality concepts: 
What is the difference between formal equality and substantive equality? What is 
systemic discrimination? What is the role of section 15(2)? Can violations of women’s 
sex equality rights be justified in a free and democratic society under section 1 without 
violating the section 28 commitment that all rights and freedoms in the Charter are 
guaranteed equally to men and women? 
Since Andrews,6 the Court has made at least seven foundational renovations to 
the section 15 legal test and sustained a four-year period from 1995 to 1999 during 
                                                          
2
 Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE, [2004] SCJ No. 61, 2004 SCC 66 found provincial restrictions on pay 
equity violated s. 15 but ruled the violation justifiable in the existing financial circumstances. Sex discrimination 
cases brought by women that were dismissed at the s. 15 stage were: Symes v. Canada, [1993] SJC No 161, [1993] 
4 SCR 695; Native Women's Association of Canada v. Canada, [1994] SCJ No. 93, [1994] 3 SCR 627; Thibaudeau v. 
Canada, [1995] SCJ No. 42, [1995] 2 SCR 627; Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining 
Association v. British Columbia, [2007] SCJ No. 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 succeeded on the union’s s. 2(d) Charter 
challenge but the s. 15 claim was dismissed in just nine sentences (para. 164-167). Other equality rights cases have 
succeeded under s. 15 in ways that advance equality for women; however these successful cases before Alliance 
were argued as discrimination based on grounds other than  sex, including disability, marital status, and civil status. 
3
 Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] SCJ No. 26, [1997] 1 SCR 358; Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [2003] SJC No. 32, [2003] 1 SCR 835. 
4
 [2018] SCJ No. 18, 2018 SCC 18 (“CSQ”). 
5
 [1989] SCJ No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 
6
 This recitation of jurisprudential about-faces is updated from my book chapter: Fay Faraday, “Working Towards 
Equality” in Unions Matter: Advancing Democracy, Economic Equality and Social Justice, Matthew Berens ed. 
(Toronto: Between the Lines, 2014) at 165. See also Jennifer Koshan and Jonette Watson Hamilton, “The Continual 




which there was no majority position whatsoever on the legal test.7 That interregnum 
was followed by nineteen years during which three core equality concepts were adopted 
by a unanimous or majority court, only to be explicitly rejected in very short order.8 
These reversals were then situated within a new characterization of the relationship 
between sections 15(1) and 15(2) of the Charter, only to have the Court restore the 
original relationship a decade later.9 With every section 15 case, the Court states the 
legal test for equality rights with a slightly different nuance, leaving litigators and 
scholars alike struggling to parse the significance, if any, of minute variations in 
wording. Despite strong analysis in the 2018 majority judgments, however, the 
jurisprudential restlessness threatens to continue as both appeals were decided by 
narrow margins10 in which the majority and dissent again applied mutually incompatible 
understandings of the four basic equality concepts identified above. 
This perpetual instability makes equality litigation extremely unpredictable. It also 
invites litigants to repeatedly contest section 15’s core principles. The meaning of 
equality is thus always up for debate which undermines social discourse about and 
commitment to equality as a fundamental right. Two government-led legal processes in 
the immediate wake of Alliance and CSQ bear witness to this. Just five months after 
Alliance, a federal pay equity law was introduced11 which included provisions negating 
                                                          
7
 In the Court’s 1995 equality rights trilogy, the nine judges between them generated three distinct legal tests, one 
with a fourth variation. No test secured majority support: Egan v. Canada, [1995], SCJ No. 43, [1995] 2 SCR 513; 
Miron v. Trudel, [1995] SCJ No. 44, [1995] 2 SCR 418; Thibaudeau v. Canada, supra note 2. This discordance 
persisted until the Court’s unanimous decision in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 
SCJ No. 16, [1999] 1 SCR 497 which essentially confirmed and elaborated on the original Andrews test. 
8
 In 1999 Law v. Canada, supra note 7 introduced consideration of whether “human dignity” was violated; that 
concept was explicitly rejected nine years later in R. v. Kapp, [2008] SCJ No. 42, 2008 SCC 41. In 2004, Hodge v. 
Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] SCJ No. 60, 2004 SCC 65 introduced “mirror 
comparators”; that concept was explicitly rejected seven years later in Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2011] SJC No. 12, 2011 SCC 12. In 2008, R. v. Kapp rejected the “human dignity” test, but introduced a 
discrimination test focused narrowly on “stereotype and prejudice”; that test was explicitly rejected seven years 
later in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, [2013] SCJ No. 5, 2013 SCC 5. 
9
 R v. Kapp, supra note 8 introduced a framework by which “if the government relies on s. 15(2) to defend the 
distinction” identified in the first step of the s. 15(1) test , “the analysis proceeds immediately to whether the 
distinction is saved by s. 15(2)”: Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham, 2011 SCJ 
No. 35, 2011 SCC 35 at para. 43-44. Ten years later, Alliance, supra note 1 at para.39 rejected the notion that s. 
15(2) is a stand-alone defence to s. 15(1) claims. 
10
 Alliance was decided by a 6-3 majority.  In CSQ the Court ruled 5-4 that s. 15 was violated, but the s. 15 majority 
split 4-1 in ruling the violation was justified under s. 1. Ultimately, eight judges upheld the law as constitutional. 
11




legal principles that the SCC had just enunciated and which replicated provisions 
previously struck down as unconstitutional.12 Meanwhile, in pay equity litigation, the 
Ontario Attorney General argued that reliance on the two SCC pay equity rulings was 
“misplaced and unhelpful” even though they addressed substantially the same legal 
issues that were at stake in Ontario.13 The federal statute’s failure to reflect current legal 
principles, and the extreme formalism of Ontario’s radically narrow approach to 
constitutional precedent, both signal an abiding resistance to equality in practice. They 
raise serious grounds to question whether, in a period of intensifying political 
polarization, the federal and provincial governments have stopped engaging in the 
“Charter dialogue” when it comes to equality rights.14 While Alliance marks one step 
forward in equality jurisprudence, these subsequent government actions may mark two 
steps backwards for women’s equality rights in practice. 
 Part II of this paper provides an orientation to the socio-economic context of the 
gender pay gap, the elements of that gap which are targeted by pay equity, and the 
evolution of the right to equal pay for work of equal value that is enshrined in pay equity 
laws.  
Part III provides an overview of Alliance and CSQ. The cases, respectively, 
address women’s right to an enduring remedy for systemic sex discrimination and 
women’s access to pay equity remedies in female-dominated workplaces.  
Part IV grapples with the enduring fault lines in the jurisprudence. In examining 
the four foundational questions about formal vs substantive equality, systemic 
discrimination, the role of section 15(2), and an equality lens on section 1, the paper 
confronts the discomfort that chafes beneath the Court’s declaration that, while 
                                                          
12
 Alliance, supra note 1; Syndicat de la fonction publique du Québec inc. c. Québec (Procureur général), 2004 CanLII 
76338 (QCCS) 
13
 Factum of the Intervener, The Attorney General of Ontario in Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Participating 
Nursing Homes; Service Employees International Union Local 1 v. Participating Nursing Homes, Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice (Divisional Court), Court File Nos. 362/16, 364/16, 444/16 and 445/16 at para. 68 and 95-98 (on file 
with the author). 
14
 Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the 




cherished, equality is “perhaps the Charter’s most conceptually difficult provision”.15 Part 
IV uses Alliance and CSQ to speak to the silences in the jurisprudence – the obdurate 
refusal to speak about power – that prevent a consistent analysis of how systemic 
discrimination operates.  
Part V examines the fragility of section 15’s protection in the face of political 
resistance to the principle of substantive equality. It uses the federal Pay Equity Act and 
Ontario’s litigation techniques to reflect on this tension and its implications for section 
15’s future. 
 
II – CONTEXT: THE GENDER PAY GAP IN CANADA16 
Systemic sex discrimination that suppresses women’s pay has long been 
documented and condemned in Canada. As early as 1984, Rosalie Abella J.’s landmark 
Equality in Employment Royal Commission Report stated that the fact systemic sex 
discrimination lowers women’s pay is “one of the few facts not in dispute in the ‘equality’ 
                                                          
15
 Law v. Canada, supra note 7 at para. 2 
16
 While this paper follows the structure of pay equity legislation which speaks of discrimination between “female-
” and “male-” dominated jobs, the author recognizes that gender is fluid and not confined to a rigid binary of 
female/male. Human rights statutes in every Canadian jurisdiction protect against discrimination based on gender 
identity and gender expression: see, for example, Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 3(1); Ontario 
Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19, sections 1 through 7; cf Saskatchewan Human Rights Act, 2018, S.S. 
2018, c. S-24.2, s. 2(1) which lists gender identity as a prohibited ground of discrimination but not gender 
expression. Research is beginning to document workplace discrimination – including pay discrimination – based on 
gender identity and gender expression: We’ve Got Work to Do: Workplace Discrimination and Employment 
Challenges for Trans People in Ontario, 2:1 Trans Pulse E-Bulletin (May 30, 2011);  Ishani Nath, “For transgender 
women the pay gap is even wider”, Macleans (February 8, 2018) online at: https://www.macleans.ca/society/for-
transgender-women-the-pay-equity-gap-is-even-wider/ (accessed July 28, 2019). To date, however, pay equity 
analysis struggles to break out of the female/male binary because the sex discrimination that results in unequal 
pay has been driven by practices which, over centuries, have institutionalized the devaluation and marginalization 
of work done by those who identify as women based on norms and prescribed gender roles anchored in a 
female/male binary. Similarly, the statistical and socio-economic data which establish an evidence-based 
correlation between female-dominance of occupations and suppressed pay reflects that binary. Parallel in-depth 
and long-term research documenting similar correlations between occupations and suppressed pay on other 
grounds – including race, Indigeneity, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression – has 
not yet been conducted, owing in large part to a lack of data that disaggregates statistics on these grounds.  A 




debate”.17 Yet, despite laws that have prohibited sex discrimination in pay for 
generations, a large and measurable systemic gender pay gap continues to impoverish 
women relative to men across the country and across the labour market. 
Various metrics are used to measure the gender pay gap between women’s and 
men’s earnings. The size of the gap differs whether it is measured by hourly pay, full-
time/full-year pay or annual earnings; but on all measures women are paid significantly 
less than men.18  
Annual earnings provide the most realistic picture of how much less money 
women have than men to meet their needs. The gender pay gap annual earnings 
measure also captures the many ways that systemic sex discrimination resonates in 
women’s pay, including as a result of: (a) prejudicial treatment in hiring, training and 
promotions; (b) sex-based occupational segregation; (c) devaluation of women’s skills 
and labour in traditional “female” occupations; (d) women’s overrepresentation in part-
time, casual, seasonal and temporary help agency work; (e) women’s 
overrepresentation in minimum wage work; (f) gender-based violence that drives 
women from jobs and/or occupations; (g) barriers to unionization which arise because 
generations-old labour legislation was designed around male full-time work patterns; 
and (h) women’s disproportionate burden in performing unpaid care work.19 
   Canada’s 2016 Census data20 on women’s and men’s annual earnings reveal 
that on average, women across Canada earn 32% less than men. This gap is larger for 
women with disabilities (56%), immigrant women (55%), Indigenous women (45%) and 
racialized women (40%). The precise wage gap varies by province,21 but the existence 
of the gender pay gap, and its pattern of exacerbation through intersecting forms of 
                                                          
17
 Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella, Equality in Employment: A Royal Commission Report (Canada: 1984) (“Abella 
Report”) at 232 
18
 See for example, Ontario, Final Report and Recommendations of the Gender Wage Gap Steering Committee, 
prepared for the Minister of Labour and Minister for Women’s Issues (2016) (“Gender Wage Gap Report”) at 17-18  
19
 Ontario Equal Pay Coalition, Fact Sheet #1: Facts and Figures about the Gender Pay Gap (2019) 
20
 These are the most current comprehensive statistics at the time of writing. 
21
 Alberta has the largest gender pay gap at 41%: see Kathleen Lahey, Equal Worth: Designing Effective Pay Equity 




discrimination persists across all provinces.22 In 2019, Canada has the seventh largest 
gender pay gap out of the 35 countries in the OECD and the second largest gender pay 
gap in the G7.23 
The gender pay gap is pervasive. As economist Kate McInturff revealed, “women 
are paid less than men in almost every occupational category measured by Statistics 
Canada (469 of 500 occupations if you want to be precise).”24 Women are paid less at 
every age group in the workforce. The gap is lowest at ages 15-24 (18%); peaks at 
ages 25-34 (39.6%); then remains between 33% and 38% throughout the rest of 
women’s working lives. A lifetime of suppressed wages leads to a 34% gender gap in 
women’s pensions.25 Women receive a lower return on their educational investment 
than men as women are paid less than men at every level of educational attainment 
from high school (27%), through apprenticeship and trades (39.6%), to undergraduate 
education (35%).26 Women are paid less than men at every income decile, except for 
the lowest 10% of earners where women receive $190 more per year than men.27 
This gender pay gap persists despite multiple legal commitments to women’s 
right to discrimination-free pay. As observed by Abella J. in her Royal Commision 
                                                          
22
 Canada, Census (2016), Annual Earnings. See Sheila Block and Grace-Edward Galabuzi, Persistent Inequality: 
Canada’s Colour-coded Labour Market (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (December 2018) on the 
intersection of race and sex in suppressing wages. Their analysis reveals an earnings hierarchy in which non-
racialized men are the highest earners followed in descending order by racialized men, non-racialized women and 
finally racialized women. 
23
 OECD (2019), Gender wage gap (indicator). doi: 10.1787/7cee77aa-en (Accessed on 28 July 2019). The OECD 
measures the gender pay gap using the median annual earnings of women and men who work full-time. 
24
 Kate McInturff, Women’s Work: What is it Worth to You? (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives: 1 January 
2016). 
25
 Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Closing the Gender Pay Gap: Background Paper (October 2015) at 22-23. See also: 
Girl Guides of Canada, Girls on the Job: Realities in Canada (2019) which partnered with Ipsos on a survey which 
revealed that girls in high school earn on average $3 less per hour than boys and were streamed into traditionally 
female care work. See also Statistics Canada, Income of individuals by age group, sex and income source, Canada, 
provinces and selected census metropolitan areas, Table 11-10-0239-01 (formerly CANSIM 206-0052); and 
Statistics Canada, The Economic Well-Being of Women (2018), Catalogue 89-503-X, Tables 3a and 3b. 
26
 Ontario, Closing the Gender Pay Gap, supra note 25 at 22 
27
 Mary Cornish, Every Step You Take: Ontario’s Gender Pay Gap Ladder (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
2016). Moving through the income ladder, women faced the following gender pay gaps at the respective deciles: 
the lowest 20% of earners 15%; in the lowest 30% of earners: 27%; mid-range deciles: 25%; top 10% of earners: 
37% gap. Meanwhile, a study of women who are CEOs and top executives of Canadian corporations face a 32% pay 
gap relative to their male colleagues: David Macdonald, Double-Paned Glass Ceiling: The Gender Pay Gap at the 




report: “the [pay] gap persists through good times and bad times. It persists in the face 
of society’s commitment to justice. It persists in defiance of the law.”28 
Canada’s legal obligations to eliminate sex-based pay discrimination exist at both 
the international and domestic level. In 1919, the International Labour Organization 
recognized women’s right to equal pay for work of equal value in its founding 
Constitution.29 As a member of the ILO, Canada is bound by this Constitution. The ILO’s 
1951 Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100) which elaborated on this right was 
ratified by Canada in 1972.30  Canada has ratified successive international human rights 
instruments – including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women31 and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action32 – with 
increasingly prescriptive directions exhorting governments to take positive action, 
including legislative action, to achieve equal pay for work of equal value. In 1998, the 
ILO declared women’s right to equal pay for work of equal value one of its eight 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.33 
These international human rights commitments34 have influenced Canada’s 
legislative action toward increasingly proactive obligations to close the gender pay gap35 
                                                          
28
 Abella Report, supra note 17 at 232 
29
 International Labour Organization, Constitution (Preamble) 
30
 Adoption: Geneva 34th ILC Session (29 June 1951); entry into force 23 May 1953; ratified by Canada 16 
November 1972 
31
 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS  13  (entered into force 3 September 1981; accession by Canada 10 
December1981) at article 11 (“CEDAW”) 
32
 United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China (1995) chap. 2, resolution 1, 
annex 1 (Beijing Declaration) and annex II (Beijing Platform for Action) Strategic Objectives F.1, para. 165(a), F.2, 
para. 166(l), F.5, para. 178(a), (k), (l). 
33
 International Labour Organization, (General Conference, 86th Sess., Geneva, June 1998) 
34
 Canada has ratified numerous international instruments committing it equal pay for work of equal value. But the 
most recent UN Periodic Reviews of Canada’s compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and CEDAW each expressly highlight the 
reviewing committee’s concerns about the persistent gender pay gap across Canada and its exacerbated impact on 
Indigenous women, racialized women and low income women; the persistence of horizontal and vertical sex 
segregation of occupations; and a lack of affordable childcare that perpetuates sex segregation of occupations, the 
gender pay gap and women’s continuing primary role in unpaid care work :UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada, 23 March 2016, E/C.12/CAN/CO/6 
at 5, para.21; UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada, 11 
August 2016, CCPC/C/CAN/CO/6 at 2, para.C7; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding observations on the combined eighth and ninth periodic reports of Canada, 25 November 




using the legal standard of “equal pay for work of equal value”. “Pay equity” is the term 
of art which refers to this specific legal standard.  
In 1951, the same year ILO Convention No. 100 was adopted, Ontario introduced 
the Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act – Canada’s first statute to protect 
women’s right to equal pay without discrimination based on sex. Between 1952 and 
1975, the federal government and remaining provinces followed suit. These “first wave” 
equal pay guarantees –now incorporated into employment standards legislation – 
protect women’s right to be paid the same as men doing substantially the same work.  
The “second wave” of protections came as provincial and federal human rights 
statutes were adopted between 1962 and 1979. 36 Human rights laws give broad 
guarantees of equality in all aspects of employment from advertising for jobs, through 
recruitment, hiring, training, pay, benefits, promotions, harassment on the job, 
terminations, and discriminatory impacts of any other terms and conditions of work.  
These two statutory frameworks had limited impact on closing the gender pay 
gap, however, because they require individual women to file complaints about their 
circumstances. Combatting systemic wage discrimination that permeates the labour 
market cannot be done effectively one woman, one case at a time. Thus, in 1986, five 
years after Canada acceded to CEDAW, provinces began introducing pay equity 
statutes which mandated employers to proactively deliver equal pay for work of equal 
value.37  
Women in Canada remain “concentrated in industries that parallel their traditional 
gender roles at more than double the rate of men”; within industries, “women and men 
tend to occupy distinct occupations, with women’s typically being at lower levels than 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
35
 See the history outlined in Alliance, supra note 1 at para. 6-11.  
36
 Territorial human rights codes were introduced later: Yukon (1987), North-West Territories (2002), Nunavut 
(2003). 
37
 Manitoba introduced Canada’s first proactive pay equity legislation in 1986. In 1987, Ontario introduced the first 
proactive pay equity legislation that applied to both the public and private sector and in 1992 expanded the law to 
become the first pay equity statute that provided remedies for women who work in predominantly female 
workplaces in the broader public sector. In 1996, Quebec introduced the first statute that provided pay equity 




men’s”; and across industries women continue to work in occupations that parallel 
traditional gender roles of care work, education and service.38 The proportion of women 
working in the twenty most female-dominated occupations in Canada has barely shifted 
in more than a generation, from 59.2% in 1987 to 56.1% in 2015.39 Pay equity laws 
address the fact that sex segregation by occupation and workplace is accompanied by 
systemic devaluation of the work women do. As the Ontario Pay Equity Hearings 
Tribunal summarized in one of Canada’s foundational pay equity rulings: 
Women are paid less because they are in women’s jobs, and women’s jobs are 
paid less because they are done by women. The reason is that women’s work – 
in fact, virtually anything done by women – is characterized as less valuable. In 
addition, the characteristics attributed to women are those our society values 
less. In the workplace, the reward (wage) is based on the characteristics the 
worker is perceived as bringing to the task. … The lower the value of those 
characteristics, the lower the associated wage.40 
 Since 1987 the SCC has recognized that discrimination arises from the continued 
operation of systems that have been designed around the interests, values and 
experiences of groups with greater political, economic and social power and privilege. 
Whether it is intentional or not, this systemic discrimination is frequently a product of 
continuing to do things ‘the way they have always been done’.41  
Pay equity laws identify how these unspoken assumptions and practices operate 
and eliminate their discriminatory effects. They address the impact of the sex 
segregation of work by comparing the wages of women and men doing different jobs of 
similar value. Pay equity laws impose proactive obligations on employers that generally 
track these five steps: 
                                                          
38
 Melissa Moyser, Women and Paid Work (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, corrected version published March 9, 2017) 
at 22-24. 
39
 Moyser, Women and Paid Work, supra note 38 at 23-24 and Table 7. 
40
 Ontario Nurses’ Association v Women’s College Hospital (1992), 3 P.E.R. 61 (ONT PEHT) at para. 16-18. See also 
Haldimand-Norfolk (No. 3) (1990), 1 P.E.R. 17 para 44; aff’d (1990), 1 P.E.R. 188 (Ont. Div. Ct.) and Marie-Therese 
Chicha, L'equite salariale: mise en oeuvre et enjeux, 3è ed.,( Cowansville: Editions Yvon Blais, 2011) at 23. 
41
 See CN v Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] SCJ No. 42 at para 34, [1987] 1 SCR 1114 at 1138-
1139: “systemic discrimination in an employment context is discrimination that results from the simple operation 
of established procedures … none of which is necessarily designed to promote discrimination.” See also: British 




Step 1: Identify which jobs are female-dominated, male-dominated or 
neutral in that they do not reflect a gender predominance in present 
or historical incumbency or norms. 
Step 2: Evaluate female-dominated and male-dominated jobs based on 
their skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions to determine, 
in a gender-neutral way, the value of all jobs to the employer.  
Step 3: Compare the total compensation of female- and male-dominated 
jobs of similar value.  
Step 4: Adjust the total compensation of female-dominated jobs to close 
the pay gap where they are paid less than male-dominated jobs of 
similar value. 
Step 5: Monitor compensation on an ongoing basis to ensure that as new 
jobs are created, old jobs disappear and duties of existing jobs 
change of over time, discriminatory devaluation of women’s work is 
not revived. Where pay equity gaps re-emerge, employers must 
maintain pay equity by adjusting the pay of female-dominated jobs 
on an ongoing basis to close the pay equity gaps as they arise.42 
In unionized workplaces, pay equity statutes typically require that this process be 
conducted with active participation of the bargaining agent. In non-unionized 
workplaces, employers conduct the analysis to create a pay equity plan but workers 
must be given a period to review and challenge the employer’s analysis. 
Pay equity laws epitomize the active intervention that the SCC has recognized is 
necessary to “break a continuing cycle of systemic discrimination”; “to create a climate 
in which both negative practices and negative attitudes can be challenged”; and to 
“destroy those patterns in order to prevent the same type of discrimination in the future.” 
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They are consistent with Canada’s bedrock human rights principle that systemic 
discrimination requires systemic remedies.43 
III – THE QUEBEC PAY EQUITY APPEALS 
 Both 2018 pay equity appeals arose from challenges to Quebec’s PEA.44  
1. CSQ: Pay Equity in Female-Dominated Workplaces 
 The legal challenge in CSQ was brought by unionized women – primarily 
childcare workers and language interpreters – working in traditionally female-dominated 
occupations in deeply sex segregated industries. Their workplaces had no male-
dominated jobs. They argued that by imposing a multi-year delay and denial of a 
remedy for sex-based wage discrimination in female-dominated workplaces, the PEA 
violated their right to equality contrary to section 15. 
The PEA was passed in 1996. Section 1 expressed the laws purpose as being to 
“redress differences in compensation due to the systemic gender discrimination suffered 
by persons who occupy positions in predominantly female job classes.” Further, it stated 
that women working in female-dominated workplaces without male-dominated jobs have 
the right to pay equity using wage comparisons from outside their specific enterprise.  
The law required employers, generally, to pay out any identified pay equity 
adjustments beginning in 2001.45 But for women working in Quebec’s over 2,000 
female-dominated private sector workplaces,46 the PEA delayed their pay equity 
remedies for 11 years. Regulations directing how to select male comparators from 
outside sex segregated workplaces were not made for nine years.47 Section 38 of the 
PEA granted a further two-year grace period for employers to implement the 
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comparisons.48  For these women, section 38 and section 129 of the PEA rendered pay 
equity a right without a remedy until 2007 and they received no remedy for 
discrimination that existed before 2007. During this entire eleven-year period from 1996 
to 2007, women in female-dominated workplaces had no other legal recourse for sex 
discrimination in pay because the PEA prohibited them from seeking remedies under 
the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms.49   
The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the section 15 Charter claim. While 
acknowledging that the PEA imposed a disadvantage on women, the Court found that 
“the reason [for the disadvantage] is not that women occupy these positions but rather 
than the enterprises that hire them have no predominantly male job classes to ensure 
comparison”.50 Accordingly, the distinction was not based on sex but on “working in an 
enterprise where there are no predominantly male job classes”; this did not qualify as an 
analogous ground.51 Without citing section 15(2) of the Charter, the Court held that 
government had no obligation to address pay equity. Rather than delaying access to 
pay equity, section 38 should be read as establishing the timetable to enable women to 
access pay equity remedies.52  
The Quebec Court of Appeal issued a one-sentence ruling: “Nous partageons 
entièrement l'avis du juge de première instance.”53 
The Supreme Court of Canada split 5-4 on the section 15 analysis. Five judges54 
ruled that section 38 of the PEA violates section 15 of the Charter by discriminating on 
the basis of sex; but four found this justifiable under section 1. Four judges found no 
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section 15 violation because they held the differential treatment was based on “the lack 
of male comparators in their employers’ enterprises,” not sex.55 Only McLachlin CJC 
found a section 15 violation that could not be justified under section 1.56 
2. Alliance: Employers’ Duty to Maintain Pay Equity 
 Alliance addresses employers’ duty to maintain pay equity after it is first 
established. The original 1996 PEA required employers to maintain pay equity by 
adjusting compensation an ongoing basis as pay discrimination re-emerged over time. 
Despite statutory deadlines for compliance, by 2006 only 47% of employers had pay 
equity plans and a further 38% had not even begun the pay equity process. The Court 
writes: “[f]aced with this widespread non-compliance, Quebec decided to reduce the 
employers’ obligation to maintain pay equity, in the hope that doing so would lead to 
better compliance.”57 In 2009, amendments replaced employers’ continuous pay equity 
maintenance obligation with pay equity audits to be conducted every five years.58 
Where an audit disclosed a discriminatory pay gap, absent proof of employer bad faith, 
the remedy only adjusted women’s pay on a go-forward basis.59 Unlike pay equity plans 
which are negotiated with the union, the pay equity audits were conducted by the 
employer alone. The employer was required to post the audit results but was not 
required to disclose the information and analysis upon which those results were 
based.60 
The pay equity audit and maintenance provisions affect all Quebec workers who 
are subject to the PEA. Several unions jointly challenged these provisions,61 arguing 
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that by allowing remedies only every five years and only on a go-forward basis, the PEA 
created periods during which identified discrimination was not rectified. Further, by 
excluding unions from the pay equity audits and denying access to the information and 
analysis on which the audit results were based, the PEA denied the ability to determine 
if the audits were valid. 
The Quebec Superior Court and Quebec Court of Appeal both agreed that by 
prohibiting remedies for pay discrimination that emerged during the five years between 
audits and by prohibiting access to the audit information, the PEA violated section 15 
and that violation was not justifiable under section 1.62 Both Quebec courts ruled that 
the PEA did not discriminate based on sex by allowing employers to conduct pay equity 
audits without union involvement.63 The Attorney General of Quebec appealed the 
decisions. The Unions cross-appealed the ruling on unions’ exclusion from pay equity 
audits. 
The SCC ruled 6-3 in favour of the claimants on the lack of remedy between 
audits and the denial of audit information.64 They ruled, however, that the unions “have 
not …discharged their onus of proving that the lack of employee participation has a 
discriminatory impact in the circumstances of this case.”65 The dissenting judges held 
that there was no violation of section 15 and even if there was, “the Act as a whole 
should be protected under s. 15(2)”.66 
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IV – ONE STEP FORWARD: RECOGNIZING SYSTEMIC 
DISCRIMINATION 
1. Confronting Privilege 
Throughout its section 15 jurisprudence, the SCC has waxed rhapsodic over the 
idea of equality, proclaiming that section 15 “reflect[s] the fondest dreams, the highest 
hopes and the finest aspirations of Canadian society”.67 At the same time, though, the 
Court is less comfortable with equality as a reality, protesting that “the difficulty lies in 
giving real effect to equality”.68 This sentiment was echoed in Binnie J.’s declaration in 
Newfoundland v. NAPE that “pay equity has been one of the most difficult and 
controversial workplace issues of our times.”69 In both Alliance and CSQ, Côté J. firmly 
roots her dissenting reasons within the “difficulty” frame, bemoaning the “almost 
inherent difficulty” in interpreting section 15 and reiterating Binnie J.’s complaint that pay 
equity is difficult.70 Yet, these conclusory declarations of equality’s purported difficulty 
are offered without explanation of – and ward off scrutiny of—what precisely about 
equality makes it so difficult to understand and implement. The protestations moreover 
ring hollow when the SCC routinely deals with legally complex, high stakes appeals in 
criminal, tax, transnational corporate law, amongst others, without complaining that they 
are too difficult. So what is it about equality that makes the Court squeamish? 
Equality litigation is “difficult” – or more accurately gives rise to feelings of 
discomfort – precisely because it confronts how law operates as the tool that 
institutionalizes power and privilege in society.71 In judicial reasoning, the presumption 
of a law’s constitutionality at times is conflated with an assumption of compliance with 
constitutional norms in practice. This erases the reality and dynamics of systemic 
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discrimination and replaces them with the narrative that discrimination is aberrant rather 
than endemic:72 
Charter litigation … is premised on the notion that the baseline experience 
is one of constitutional compliance that delivers security and rights 
protection. The unspoken assumption is that an individual starts with an 
experience of rights protection and the impugned state action is an 
aberrant divergence from that presumed status of [constitutional] 
security.73  
From the outset, Charter equality jurisprudence has stressed that discrimination 
is primarily systemic. Yet, most Charter litigation has challenged isolated provisions in a 
single statute which may deny access to a specific benefit. These cases are 
overwhelmingly formal equality claims involving direct discrimination.74 This repetition 
reinforces formal equality as the paradigmatic case, creating the impression that 
discrimination is narrow and isolated and that only minor adjustments are required to 
achieve equality. Only rare Charter claims have challenged the structural roots of 
systemic discrimination and those have met with mixed success.75 To paraphrase 
Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Jennifer Koshan, while accepting substantive equality in 
principle, the Court struggles to shed formal equality as the paradigmatic case which in 
turn impairs the Court’s ability to grapple with systemic discrimination.76 
In examining the categorical declarations that equality and pay equity are 
“difficult”, then, it is important to disaggregate what is in fact jurisprudentially complex, 
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and what is better characterized as conceptual dissonance or avoidance techniques 
that arise in legal reasoning.  
2. Advancing a Substantive Equality Analysis of Systemic Discrimination 
Justice Abella’s majority reasons in Alliance and CSQ demonstrate that a 
rigorous substantive equality analysis that addresses the impact of systemic 
discrimination is possible. Her reasons mark an advance in substantive equality 
analysis and the role of section 15(2) of the Charter. They also make inroads in bringing 
a gendered lens to section 1 analysis that may open the way to activate section 28 of 
the Charter in constitutional analysis. 
(a) Systemic Discrimination77 
Systemic discrimination refers to how power structures relationships between 
groups in society, privileging some and marginalizing others.78 Within this power 
dynamic, dominant groups attach socially constructed meaning to human traits – such 
as sex – and have entrenched social systems and behaviours that institutionalize those 
traits as a basis on which to unequally distribute social, economic and political rights, 
material well-being, social inclusiveness and social participation.79 As the SCC has 
observed, systemic discrimination institutionalizes practices that, through 
the imbalances of power, or the discourses of dominance, such as racism, 
ablebodyism and sexism, … result in a society being designed well for 
some and not for others. It allows those who consider themselves ‘normal’ 
to continue to construct institutions and relations in their image …80 
Systemic discrimination claims target the impact of practices and systems that 
have been established and normalized over time within this unequal power 
relationship.81 They “necessarily involve an examination of the interrelationships 
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between actions (or inaction), attitudes and established organizational structures”. 
Claims “alleging gender-based systemic discrimination cannot be understood or 
assessed through a compartmentalized view”; instead they must be “understood, 
considered, analyzed and decided in a complete, sophisticated and comprehensive 
way.”82 
Justice Abella’s majority reasons undertake just such a comprehensive view. 
They accept that systemic sex discrimination is real and identify how it operates to 
create and sustain a gender pay gap which disadvantages women. They also 
steadfastly maintain a systemic frame when analyzing the impact of the impugned 
statutory provisions.  
The majority reasons in both appeals accept that in reality there is a “deep and 
persistent gap between women’s and men’s pay”83 and that women have been and 
continue to be underpaid due to systemic discrimination which devalues women’s work 
socially and economically.84 Justice Abella succinctly captures the essence of systemic 
sex discrimination which deprives “women of benefits routinely enjoyed by men – 
namely, compensation tied to the value of their work. Men receive this compensation as 
a matter of course” while women must repeatedly “clear the specific hurdle of proving 
that they should be paid equally not merely because they are equal, but because their 
employer acted improperly.”85  
Significantly, understanding how sex discrimination operates systemically leads 
the majority to recognize that discrimination in pay “exists in the workforce whether or 
not there are male comparators in a particular workplace” and that “women in 
workplaces without male comparators may suffer more acutely from the effects of pay 
inequity precisely because of the absence of men in their workplaces.”86 In this way the 
majority integrates a full understanding of how a deeply sex segregated labour market 
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and sex segregated workplaces in which female-dominated work is most devalued are 
the end products of the systemic devaluation of women’s work. 
As a result, the majority in CSQ easily identified that denying a pay equity 
remedy to women in female-dominated workplaces was based on sex. Access to a 
remedy was “expressly defined by the presence or absence of men in the workplace” 
and women in female-dominated workplaces are “the group of women whose pay has, 
arguably, been most markedly impacted by their gender”. 87 In the PEA, women’s close 
proximity to male work determines whether they are entitled to a remedy for systemic 
sex discrimination.  The more women have suffered from systemic sex discrimination 
that results in deeply sex-segregated occupations, sex-segregated workplaces, and 
undervaluing of women’s work, the less they are entitled to remedies for systemic sex 
discrimination. 
Similarly, understanding the dynamics of systemic discrimination enabled the 
majority in Alliance to recognize that systemic pay discrimination is not simply historical 
but operates on a continuing basis.88 This lead the majority to recognize that the pay 
audit process that provided remedies only on a go-forward basis was discriminatory 
because it effectively granted an amnesty from equality compliance of up to five years. 
As the Court noted, “this has the effect of making the employer’s pay equity obligation 
an episodic, partial obligation.”89 But “the Charter right to equality is not episodic right 
that exists only at designated intervals but slumbers without effect between times”.90 It 
must be protected in a continuous, enduring way and remedies for its breach must be 
similarly seamless. Finally, in understanding systemic discrimination as an ongoing 
pattern of behavior, Abella J. recognized that denying access to the information 
underpinning pay equity audits was discriminatory because it undermines any air of 
reality to the promise of equality. Access to that information was a necessary 
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operational precondition to verifying the audit and exercising any right to challenge its 
results. 
The majority reasons, then, mark an advance because the reality of systemic 
discrimination is not merely observed once in passing but the systemic lens remains at 
the forefront, shaping the entire section 15 analysis. 
(b) Section 15(2)  
Section 15(2) of the Charter has bedeviled equality rights jurisprudence since the 
SCC’s 2008 ruling in R. v. Kapp91. Before this, the jurisprudence treated section 15(2) 
as an interpretive aid that supported the substantive equality interpretation of section 
15(1)92. Section 15(2) “reinforce[d] the important insight” that in a social reality of 
systemic discrimination “substantive equality requires positive action to ameliorate the 
conditions of socially disadvantaged groups”.93 
 Kapp instead gave section 15(2) independent effect as a “defence” to allegations 
of discrimination: “if the government can demonstrate that an impugned program meets 
the criteria of s. 15(2), it may be unnecessary to conduct a s. 15(1) analysis at all.”94 
Kapp provided shelter from full section 15 scrutiny if a government could demonstrate 
that the impugned law, program or activity has an ameliorative or remedial purpose and 
targets a disadvantaged group identified by enumerated or analogous grounds. Unlike 
the focus on effects that informs the rest of Canada’s equality jurisprudence,95 under 
section 15(2) the Court adopted an analysis focused exclusively on the government’s 
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intent such that the Court would ask if it was “rational for the state to conclude that the 
means chosen to reach its ameliorative goal would contribute to that purpose”.96 
Kapp and the Court’s 2011 decision in Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development) v. Cunningham97 both interpreted section 15(2) in appeals where parties 
who were not beneficiaries of an affirmative action program challenged it as being 
discriminatory.  Had the approach, in implementation, been constrained to 
circumstances involving claims of ‘reverse discrimination’ by privileged groups, this may 
not have been problematic. But, instead, in the wake of Kapp, section 15(2) has been 
raised routinely in litigation to respond to equality rights challenges.  
When used outside the context of reverse discrimination, Kapp undermined the 
integrity of the division between section 15 and section 1 of the Charter. It dragged the 
analysis of purpose and rational connection out of section 1 into section 15. As will be 
seen in addressing Côté J.’s dissenting reasons, this heightened the stakes on the first 
step of the section 15(1) test in identifying whether a “distinction” exists that needs to be 
addressed under section 15. 
Moreover, by allowing government to use section 15(2) to prevent claims by 
beneficiaries of affirmative ameliorative programs, it prevented those supposed 
beneficiaries from challenging any discriminatory impact under those programs. As 
identified by Kasari Governder and Tess Sheldon, by eliminating any analysis of the 
effect of government action, this approach effectively displaced section 15 as a rights 
framework and reduced it to a charitable framework in which disadvantaged groups 
must accept government’s good intentions as the complete scope of constitutional 
protection.98 Apart from being a paternalistic approach to the Charter which erodes 
substantive rights protection, that approach directly contradicted the well-established 
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section 15 principle that good intentions cannot save a law that has discriminatory 
effects.99 
The majority reasons in both pay equity appeals effectively pushed back at this 
development. The 2018 rulings reinforced a commitment to substantive equality by 
restoring section 15(2) to its original role as an interpretive aid to section 15(1).  The 
majority held that in the appeals at issue “s. 15(2) has no application whatever”.100 This 
step back to an earlier legal position marks a step forward in understanding how power 
dynamics operate in relationships marked by systemic discrimination. The majority 
underscored that the purpose of section 15(2) is to “save ameliorative programs from 
the charge of ‘reverse discrimination’”.101 In doing so, the majority aligns section 15(2) 
with the Court’s longstanding dictum that  
In interpreting and applying the Charter … the courts must be cautious to 
ensure that it does not simply become an instrument of better situated 
individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object the improvement 
of the condition of less advantaged persons.102 
 The majority made clear that section 15(2) is not a “stand alone defence” for 
government “to any and all claims brought under s. 15(1)”;103 it is a “defence” for those 
who are the beneficiaries of a special program that ameliorates systemic discrimination. 
Accordingly, section 15(2) can only operate in response to “a claim from someone 
outside the scope of intended beneficiaries who alleges that ameliorating those 
beneficiaries discriminates against him”.104  
This important recalibration should protect substantive equality by restoring the 
relationship between section 15 and section 1 of the Charter and by keeping section 15 
focused in a unified way on addressing systemic discrimination. The routine use of 
section 15(2) in equality litigation reinforced a legal and public discourse in which all 
equality claims are viewed as suspect while at the same time preventing analysis of 
                                                          
99
 Andrews, supra note 4 at para. 37 
100
 CSQ, supra note 4 at para. 37; Alliance, supra note 1 at para. 30 
101
 CSQ, supra note 4 at para. 38; Alliance, supra note 1 at para. 31 
102
 R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] SCJ No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (SCC) at para.136 
103
 CSQ, supra note 4 at para. 39 
104




actual systemic impacts. At a practical level, reliance on section 15(2) should cease 
except when invalidating ‘reverse discrimination’ claims.  
(c)  Bringing a Gender Lens to Section 1 
 Finally, Abella J.’s reasons in Alliance take small steps towards incorporating a 
gendered lens into assessing what is considered demonstrably justifiable in a free and 
democratic society. This is necessary to meet the Charter’s commitment in section 28 
that “the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female 
persons.” Section 28 is significantly understudied105 and has to date played a limited 
role in litigation.106  But if section 1 analysis does not consider the gendered implications 
of justifying a breach of Charter rights – including a breach of Charter rights other than 
section 15 – it risks reintroducing and rehabilitating the discriminatory norms and 
practices that were found to violate equality rights under section 15. Without a gender 
lens, systemic sex discrimination will inform what is otherwise framed as “gender 
neutral” deference to government, what is considered “rational”, what is characterized 
as “minimal impairment” and what is accepted as a “proportionate” balance between 
deleterious and beneficial impacts. As Kerri Froc writes in her landmark thesis, 
activating section 28 would keep systemic discrimination’s impact at the forefront 
throughout the whole Charter analysis: 
Viewing the Charter through a “gender equality lens” requires courts,  … 
to shift their conceptualization of gender as exclusively a matter of 
inherent identity possessed by human beings upon which neutral legal 
rules apply, to gender as a structure or as a relation. It means considering 
how constitutional doctrine is gendered, that is, examining how “gender 
acts upon [constitutional] law: how it functions in the context of conferring 
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[constitutional] meanings; how it informs the content, organization and 
apprehension of [constitutional and] legal knowledge; and how it serves to 
legitimate [constitutional] law and reinforce particular…outcomes,” 
particularly as it “consistently appears not to do so.”107 
 The impact of bringing a gender lens to or omitting it from section 1 analysis is 
well illustrated by contrasting Alliance with Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE108 
the last pay equity dispute that was heard by the SCC under the Charter.  
Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE examined provincial legislation that 
eliminated three years’ worth of pay equity adjustments that were owed to public sector 
employees. The SCC found that eliminating the pay equity debt violated section 15, but 
then derailed vindication of their equality rights by reintroducing discriminatory norms 
under section 1. The section 1 ruling was based on judicial notice and what the Court 
acknowledged was a “casually introduced” record whose weakness would normally be 
of “serious concern”.109 Despite this, the Court accepted the government’s assessment 
that a financial crisis justified eliminating the pay equity payments. The Court used 
disparaging language in equating a decision to pay the equality debt to “throw[ing]” 
other claims and priorities to the winds”.110 It cast doubt on whether meeting Charter 
equality obligations “must necessarily rank ahead of hospital beds or school rooms” 
without appreciating the irony that the women staffing the hospitals at issue were the 
very ones bringing the Charter claim.111 Ultimately, the Court ruled that the effect on the 
women, while “deeply unfortunate” was “purely financial” and that it would merely “leave 
the women hospital workers with their traditionally lower wage scales for a further three 
years.”112 
By contrast, in Alliance Abella J. definitively ruled that leaving discriminatory pay 
in place after it has been identified perpetuates systemic sex discrimination.113 To 
normalize these practices is not purely financial but ideological in that it “makes women 
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‘the economy’s ordained shock absorbers’”.114 It also feeds rather than breaks the cycle 
of systemic discrimination because it 
[r]einforces one of the key drivers of pay inequity: the power imbalance 
between employers and female workers. By tolerating employer decision-
making that results in unfair pay for women, the legislature sends a 
message condoning that very power imbalance, further perpetuating 
disadvantage.115 
 
As Abella J. wrote in her 1984 Royal Commission report: 
The cost of the wage gap to women is staggering. And the sacrifice is not 
in aid of any demonstrably justifiable social goal. To argue, as some have, 
that we cannot afford the cost of equal pay to women is to imply that 
women somehow have a duty to be paid less until other financial priorities 
are accommodated. This reasoning is specious and it is based on an 
unacceptable premise that the acceptance of arbitrary distinctions based 
on gender is a legitimate basis for imposing negative consequences …116 
 
 While she didn’t make specific reference to section 28 of the Charter, Abella J. 
effectively considered whether the government’s proposed justifications for the breach 
perpetuated systemic discrimination. She found that they did. The government argued 
that it reduced employers’ pay equity maintenance obligations because it sought to 
encourage increased employer compliance with the law in a context where less than 
half of employers have complied with their obligations. Abella J. voiced reservations 
about the government’s alleged purpose and whether its chosen method was rationally 
connected to that purpose, then concluded that “the justification starts to melt away at 
the minimal impairment stage”, particularly as “[l]owering the bar in the hopes of 
compliance strikes me, in any event, as being inconsistent with respect for substantive 
equality.”117  In applying a clear gender lens, she concluded as follows on the final stage 
of the section 1 test: 
                                                          
114
 Alliance, supra note 1 at para. 8 
115
 Alliance, supra note 1 at para. 38, 40 
116
 Abella Report, supra note 17 at 234 
117




The speculative suggestion that sacrificing that right [to pay equity] in the 
hope of encouraging the possibility of better compliance, does not 
outweigh the harm caused by the limitation. 
Reducing employers’ obligations in the hopes of encouraging compliance 
subordinates the substantive constitutional entitlement of women to be 
free from discrimination in compensation to the willingness of employers to 
comply with the law. It sends the policy message to employers that 
defiance of their legal obligations under the Act will be rewarded with a 
watering-down of those obligations. And it sends the message to female 
workers that it is they who must bear the financial burdens of employer 
reluctance. Any benefits of that approach are outweighed by its harmful 
impact on the very people whom this pay equity scheme was designed to 
help. 118 
This gendered lens brings an integrity and consistency to the principles that 
inform the Charter analysis. This case takes a meaningful step forward in bringing a 
renewed critical perspective to section 1 and it lays the groundwork to explicitly 
incorporate and build on the full implications of section 28 for Charter jurisprudence. 
3. Resistance to Substantive Equality: Re-fighting Old Battles 
Even while Abella J.’s majority rulings made strides on substantive equality 
analysis, Côté J.’s dissenting reasons resuscitate arguments and techniques of 
reasoning that have been repeatedly rejected by the SCC. In this respect, the persistent 
instability at the root of equality jurisprudence does not reflect uncertainty or complexity 
in the law so much as a resistance to equality’s operation as a means of redistributing 
power and rights. The dissenting reasons yield many more examples of these 
avoidance techniques, but four will suffice. 
First, rather than following the uncontestable principle that Charter claims must 
be analyzed from the perspective of the claimant, the dissenting reasons proceed from 
the perspective of the government respondent. The dissent in Alliance begins by 
chastising the majority for holding the Quebec government to account under the Charter 
at all because  
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Quebec has been a pioneer in the struggle against pay inequities in 
private sector enterprises in Canada … From this perspective, it is 
profoundly unfair to Quebec society to claim that these amendments are 
unconstitutional.119 
Then rather than examining the PEA’s impact on the claimants, the dissent decries the 
possibility that liability could be imposed on the government based on the inflated 
premise that the PEA would “almost inevitably” be found disadvantageous if it fails to 
close the pay equity gap “perfectly”.120 In CSQ, the dissent begins with 24 paragraphs 
outlining the government’s efforts and challenges in developing the PEA and its 
associated regulation. This again anchors the analysis firmly in the government’s 
perspective and compounds the error by drawing into the section 15 analysis a full 
consideration of the government’s justifications which properly belong only under 
section 1. 
Second, despite giving lip service to the principle of substantive equality, the 
dissent actually employs a rigid formal equality analysis that takes place squarely within 
the four corners of the impugned Act.121 This approach has been roundly rejected since 
1989 on the basis that it would lead to a “mechanical and sterile” analysis that is 
disconnected from an understanding of the claimants’ location “in the entire social, 
political and legal fabric of our society”.122 In CSQ, this is precisely what arose in the 
dissent. Côté J. noted that the disadvantageously affected group “consists mostly of 
women” but one could not, on that basis, conclude that the discrimination was based on 
sex: “to resolve this issue, we must go further and ask what the basis for this differential 
treatment is.” In going further, the dissent held that the differential treatment arises not 
because of sex, but because of “the lack of male comparators in their employers’ 
enterprises”.123 There is no explanation for why the dissent’s analysis stops here. The 
dissent does not at this point “go further” to ask the key question: why is there a lack of 
male comparators? Had they done so, it would have led them to the dynamics of 
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systemic sex discrimination, which produce the sex segregated labour market that 
devalues women’s work – clearly a discriminatory dynamic based on sex. 
Third, the dissents disavow any potential government accountability for the 
discriminatory impacts experienced by the claimants on the basis that the government 
did not create the economic disadvantage; it pre-existed the PEA. The dissent takes the 
position that the government could only be found in violation of the Charter if its own 
actions made that pre-existing discrimination worse. This stance contradicts the 
longstanding principle that a claimant’s pre-existing disadvantage and the dynamics of 
systemic discrimination which produced that disadvantage are a core part of the 
contextual analysis under section 15.124 More insidiously the dissent’s approach treats 
existing systemic discrimination as an acceptable – or natural – baseline that is immune 
from Charter scrutiny. Far from eradicating existing discrimination, the dissent’s 
approach condones and preserves it. 
Fourth, the dissent takes the position that the choice to adopt the pay equity audit 
process in the PEA was a political decision that is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The dissent states categorically that this choice “belongs to the elected representatives 
of Quebecers and not to this Court.”125 The dissent raises the oft-heard and oft-rejected 
argument that if legislation intended to help disadvantaged groups was subject to 
Charter scrutiny it would discourage governments from addressing disadvantage. Abella 
J. in Alliance addresses the absurdity of the dissent’s assertions as follows:  
There is no evidence to support the in terrorem view advanced by my 
colleagues that finding a breach would have a “chilling effect” on 
legislatures. That amounts to an argument that requiring legislatures to 
comply with Charter standards would have such an effect. Speculative 
concerns about the potential for inducing statutory timidity on the part of 
legislatures has never, to date, been an accepted analytic tool for deciding 
whether the Constitution has been breached. Legislatures understand that 
they are bound by the Charter and that the public expects them to comply 
with it. The courts are facilitators in that enterprise, not bystanders.126 
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No new ground is broken by the Court in rehearsing these battles. Each sortie 
essayed by the dissent and deflected by the majority has been attempted and rejected 
in the past. But in continuing to resist the principles and logic of substantive equality, the 
dissent’s positioning seems to suggest that equality rights can somehow be achieved 
without any redistribution of rights, benefits and material well-being. This is impossible. 
Meanwhile, the routine repetition of these oft-rejected arguments means that those who 
seek to claim section 15’s protection must, with each new case, stand ready to defend 
the exact gains that have been won multiple times in the past.  
V – TWO STEPS BACKWARD: WHITHER (WITHER) CHARTER 
DIALOGUE? 
While the majority position at the SCC makes meaningful progress in advancing 
principles of substantive equality, governments seem unfazed by the Court’s 
jurisprudential direction. As a result, women’s historic Charter victory in Alliance is 
already under threat. Instead of a Charter dialogue, it appears that the phone is off the 
hook. 
First, in introducing a new proactive Pay Equity Act,127 the federal government 
appears not to be engaging in the expected Charter dialogue with the Courts.128 The 
federal PEA was introduced as part of the 884-page Budget Implementation Act, 2018 
No. 2.  
Like the Quebec PEA, the federal PEA adopts a five-year pay equity audit cycle 
for maintaining pay equity. Section 88(4) appears to provide that pay adjustments 
identified in the audit take effect on a go forward basis. Similar to Quebec, the federal 
PEA amends the otherwise-applicable Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) to prohibit 
women from filing pay discrimination complaints under it.129 Despite the fact it was 
introduced five months after Alliance was released, the federal PEA appears to replicate 
the precise effects that the SCC just ruled unconstitutional. Moreover, the federal PEA 
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enables some employers to decide that job evaluations that pre-date the new PEA are 
compliant with the new law.130 This lies in tension with Alliance’s holding that denying 
workers the information on which to evaluate and challenge employer-developed pay 
equity violates the Charter. Moreover, comparable provisions in Quebec’s PEA which 
preserved “relativity plans” that predated that province’s law were found to violate 
section 15 of the Charter and were ruled unconstitutional in 2004.131 In these respects, 
there is a clear breakdown of – or disregard for – communication on what is required for 
Charter compliance. 
The federal PEA contains other red flags that, while not previously ruled 
unconstitutional, raise meaningful concerns about prejudicial impacts on equality rights. 
The new Act’s purpose clause makes the objective of achieving pay equity subject to 
“the diverse needs of employers”. Contrary to Abella J.’s section 1 reasons in Alliance, 
this subordinates fundamental equality rights to employer-defined “needs” and also 
undercuts the existing broad right to equality in the CHRA. Canada’s PEA contains 
sweeping powers by which Cabinet can make regulations to exempt “any employer, 
employee or position, or any class of employers, employees or positions, from the 
application of any provision of this Act” with or without conditions.132 Other provisions in 
the Act actually reduce the scope of rights protection below what currently exists in the 
CHRA.133 This contradicts the basic equality rights principle that legislative action to 
address equality must move the bar forward, not back.134  
These concerns are sufficiently serious that the Standing Senate Committee on 
National Finance took the unusual step of passing BIA No. 2 but appending 
observations specifically, and only, on the new PEA. Those observations state: 
“Considering the concerns expressed by a certain number of witnesses, your committee 
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calls for the Government of Canada to initiate a parliamentary review in six years’ time 
at the latest” and suggested eight specific areas of concern to be examined.135 
Secondly, on the provincial front, the Attorney General for Ontario has adopted a 
litigation strategy that takes an aggressively narrow approach to the precedential value 
of the new SCC judgments and a formalist analysis that effectively ignores the SCC’s 
systemic analysis.  
Unionized nursing and service employees at 143 female-dominated nursing 
homes across Ontario sought to enforce pay equity maintenance using the external 
male comparators they originally used to achieve pay equity. Without access to the 
external comparators, they argued, workers in female-dominated workplace were 
denied equal benefit and protection of the maintenance provisions in the Ontario Pay 
Equity Act,136 and denied a full remedy for discrimination, in violation of section 15 of the 
Charter. In essence, the Ontario case combines the two issues addressed in the SCC 
pay equity appeals: Were women in female-dominated workplaces denied the same pay 
equity maintenance rights granted to other women under the PEA? If so, does that 
violate section 15 of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of sex? In 2016, the Pay 
Equity Hearings Tribunal denied the Unions’ applications for reasons that mirror those 
of the Quebec Superior Court in CSQ. The Tribunal found that while there was 
differential treatment under the PEA, the distinction did not discriminate because it was 
based on women’s “locus of employment” in a female-dominated workplace, not 
“sex”.137 
On judicial review, the government argued that reliance on CSQ was “misplaced 
and unhelpful” because the specific mechanics by which external comparators were 
identified for female-dominated workplaces differed in the provincial statutes and 
because the impugned effects arose from different distinguishing techniques (in Quebec 
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through delay, in Ontario through denial of access to male comparators).138 Meanwhile, 
the substantive legal question in both cases was identical: whether differential treatment 
of workers in female-dominated workplaces discriminates contrary to section 15 of the 
Charter.  
Similarly, even though both Alliance and Participating Nursing Homes addressed 
the denial of women’s rights to pay equity maintenance, Ontario argued that Alliance 
was distinguishable because the statutory mechanisms by which maintenance operated 
differed under the two provincial statutes.139 Meanwhile, the substantive legal question 
to which Alliance spoke was identical: whether denial of full remedies in the context of 
pay equity maintenance violated section 15 of the Charter.  
Finally, in the alternative, Ontario argued that any distinction under the Ontario 
PEA “is protected by section 15(2)” because the overall purpose of the PEA is to 
redress systemic gender discrimination.140 This argument tracks Côté J.’s dissents 
rather than Abella J.’s clear majority holding that section 15(2) is only available to 
dispute ‘reverse discrimination’ claims which were not at issue.  
Ultimately these legislative and litigation initiatives represent two steps 
backwards in women’s fight for substantive equality. Charter litigation is lengthy, 
resource intensive and expensive. The victory in Alliance was hard won and the 
majority’s analysis robust. It should provide strong guidance for systemic discrimination 
claims going forward. But under the current political arrangements, governments’ 
disregard of the SCC’s jurisprudential direction and rigid formalism in argument actively 
undermines women’s right to substantive equality and poses a serious threat to 
women’s access to justice. As long as this governmental resistance persists, it will 
encourage and fuel judicial recalcitrance to abandon the familiar and repeatedly 
rejected legal arguments reflected in the SCC dissents. Until then, we’ll be walking in 
circles. 
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